Multinational corporations (MNCs) increasingly internationalize research and development (R&D), but the distribution of foreign direct investment (FDI) in R&D differs from that of general FDI. I use data on US MNC affiliates' investments abroad (2001)(2002)(2003)(2004)(2005)(2006)(2007)(2008) to demonstrate that increasing value added predicts more future R&D FDI, as R&D FDI is an upgrade decision.
As highly capable people reside in all countries, and multinational corporations (MNCs) have footholds around the world, locating research and development (R&D) For a country that is host to foreign direct investment (FDI), R&D FDI carries with it the potential for technology transfer, jobs for highly skilled local workers, and spillover effects to other domestic enterprises -the sorts of characteristics that make FDI attractive to capitalseeking economies. Governments have thus sought to capitalize on the internationalization of R&D. In a survey of 84 national agencies tasked with FDI promotion, 55 percent claimed to actively promote R&D FDI, including 46 percent of the agencies in developing countries (UNCTAD 2005: 213) . The investment incentives offered around R&D FDI cover the full suite of tax reductions or exemptions, trade benefits, subsidized loans and grants, and allowances for capital and training (Johnson 2011) . Indeed, some scholars and practitioners presume that that the operative question is not whether but how to promote R&D FDI (Rama 2008 , Archibugi and Iammarino 1999 , OECD 2002b , OECD 2003 ).
Yet behind this "sense of policy urgency" around R&D FDI stands a "lack of knowledge on process and effects" (Elder and Polt 2008) . How do MNCs make decisions as to where to site R&D FDI? To what extent can government investment incentives influence that siting? Without answers to these questions, the buzz of R&D FDI promotion activity may be misguided. This paper documents variation in the distribution of R&D FDI relative to the distribution of general FDI across host countries. To explain this variation, I argue that the international distribution of R&D FDI depends on the quality of the FDI that has gone before. In particular, firms "upgrade" to R&D in locations where FDI has proved valuable, because the track record of previous FDI mitigates uncertainty around the future success of R&D investments. To demonstrate this upgrading path, I show a robust and positive association between the previous value-added activities of US affiliates and US firms' future investments in R&D abroad (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) , holding constant industry, returns from sales, returns from exports, and economy-wide determinants of FDI. Next, I test the effects of government incentive programs on the siting of R&D FDI, and I demonstrate that the presence of R&D FDI incentives has no significant effect on the distribution of R&D FDI from US affiliates.
In a world where policymakers choose to expend resources to attract R&D FDI, this paper's findings about firms' decision-making processes and the unhelpful impact of investment incentives have real implications for public policy. In short, government R&D attraction policies assume that R&D FDI can be attracted, but the empirical evidence is not compelling. While this paper provides evidence that efforts to entice new investors into R&D FDI are likely ill-advised, efforts to facilitate upgrading of current FDI to include R&D investments may be more successful.
The paper is organized as follows. The first section defines R&D FDI and describes variation in its distribution across countries. I go on to argue that R&D FDI is best understood as the result of an upgrade decision, predicated on the success of existing FDI in a country and industry. The argument draws on 21 semi-structured interviews undertaken in 2008 with top MNC executives in France and the heads of MNC affiliates at R&D labs in China, as well as follow-up interviews in the United States in 2011. i The next section provides quantitative evidence that the success of foreign affiliates in a country, measured by value-added contributions and not by market-or export platform-seeking factors, is positively associated with future R&D FDI flows. I then consider the impact of R&D FDI investment incentives on USorigin R&D FDI, using data assembled by Johnson (2011 Research and experimental development (R&D) comprise creative work undertaken on a systematic basis in order to increase the stock of knowledge, including knowledge of man, culture and society, and the use of this stock of knowledge to devise new applications. (2.1.63) By focusing on "experimental development," Frascati attempts to limit the scope of R&D to inputs that provide the solutions to problems with scientific or technical aspects (2.3.1.84).
Additionally, Frascati's expansive inclusion of R&D as that which contributes to "knowledge" helps to make measures of R&D expenditures more comprehensive, including types of innovation not necessarily covered in the development of products and processes. As investments in R&D include the acquisition of physical and human capital to aid in the firm's scientific and technical innovative capacity, it is not surprising that foreign R&D -an archetypal strategic investment -is often absorbed into the firm through FDI rather than undertaken at [ Table 1 about here.] However, the distribution of R&D FDI stock across countries suggests that the determinants behind R&D FDI differ systematically from that of FDI in general. Figure 1 summarizes variation in the international distribution of R&D FDI, reporting US-origin R&D FDI as a percent of total US-origin FDI, averaged by country (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) . iii If R&D FDI followed trends in FDI more broadly, these percentages would be consistent across destination countries. Instead, we see that Israel, Sweden, and India receive disproportionately high amounts of R&D FDI, while countries like the Netherlands, the UAE, and Nigeria receive very low amounts of R&D FDI proportional to their US-origin FDI. When comparing US-origin R&D FDI to each country's total FDI intake, the correlation coefficient is only 0.14 in this period (WDI). This paper addresses why this distribution varies and whether government-provided R&D FDI investment incentives have explanatory power.
[ Figure 1 about here.]
Figure 2 provides evidence on why understanding the process behind R&D FDI decisionmaking is important. This figure draws on UNESCO data collected for stocks of R&D FDI by host country (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) What is important to note about these approaches are the assumptions: if all countries are inherently competitive destinations for R&D FDI, then the right kinds of incentives can bid a country up to be a competitive destination. The focus of this explanation is on the host country and not the firm.
Recent scholarship offers another explanation for the international distribution of R&D FDI: firms are not calculating rational actors in their internationalization strategies, and a large number of R&D internationalization decisions are hypothesized to be "accidental" -the "unintended by-product" of mergers and acquisitions by firms that prefer to do their R&D at home (Gulbrandsen and Godoe 2007 ; see also Casson and Singh 1993, Niosi and Godin 1999) .
The contingencies of mergers and acquisitions may lead some R&D FDI investments to sprout in what seem to be unplanned locations. Nevertheless, the evidence here goes to show that longterm investment and reinvestment in R&D in a particular country is far from the result of an (ongoing) accident.
I seek to understand the distribution of R&D FDI by starting from the firm. One branch of the firm-level literature on international R&D emphasizes that firms engage in it because of market-seeking incentives, positing that internationally situated R&D facilitates product adaptation for new markets in ways home-market R&D facilities cannot (Ronstadt 1977 (Ronstadt , 1984 De Meyer 1993; Kumar 2001; Cantwell 1992; Gerybadze and Reger 1999) . Technology-seeking explanations, on the other hand, argue that internationalized R&D is a product of firms' desire for access to new and/or augmented technologies, implying that the human capital and physical infrastructure -at the right price -is a key locational determinant (Niosi and Godin 1999; Florida 1997; Ito and Wakasugi 2007; Zander 1999) . One way to operationalize technologyseeking explanations is to look for evidence that R&D FDI takes place in countries that serve as export platforms to third countries. Kuemmerle (1999) combines explanations and finds possible synergies when firms internationalize R&D for both market-and technology-seeking reasons.
These market-and export platform-seeking hypotheses for R&D FDI better account for what we know about multinational corporations' decision-making than what might look like wishful thinking on the part of governments or the unsatisfactory answer that R&D FDI is mere accident.
UPGRADING TO R&D FDI
Nevertheless, what market-and export platform-seeking explanations miss is the role of the history of FDI in a given location in explaining the distribution of R&D FDI. In fact, R&D FDI is an upgrade decision taken after prior types of FDI in a particular country have proven valuable. Home country bias in R&D location allows for economies of scale, lower cultural and/or lingual barriers between researchers, and the public benefit of employing highly skilled workers at home. The decision to move or invest in R&D abroad is, therefore, not taken lightly.
When considering R&D FDI, executives lament that the endeavor is plagued by uncertaintynot only that uncertainty common to FDI in general, but of innovation in particular. R&D investments are expensive in both resources and time: they require high-salaried researchers, close management to integrate outputs into the firm's strategic plans, and strict intellectual property and knowledge diffusion regulations. Integrating projects that require quick iteration across long distances requires planning and forethought (Locke and Wellhausen 2013).
Wherever it is located, success in R&D endeavors is not assured. Given the strategic nature of what are inherently uncertain investments, compounded with the uncertainty of locating that investment abroad in a new political and economic environment, firms are necessarily cautious in extending their R&D networks.
Putting R&D facilities in countries where existing FDI has proven valuable is a way to use prior experience to mitigate the uncertainty around long-distance R&D. In interviews with firms in a variety of industries, top R&D executives in France, the US, and at multinational subsidiaries in China discussed a process of gradually moving to fully integrated R&D FDI.
After having evidence of general FDI success in a country, these firms engaged in "pre-R&D"
investments. When these -or their competitors' equivalents -proved successful, full scale R&D investments followed.
What respondents termed pre-R&D investments are projects requiring particular scientific and/or technical expertise but which do not fit the Frascati definition of R&D. These projects might involve instances of technology transfer or exploiting overflow technical capacity rather than original scientific and technical problem solving. Such activities, which add value to a firm, are viewed as experiments designed to test a location's R&D FDI capacity. Sometimes, experiments occur outside the firm, when parent companies observe pre-R&D in local firms.
These experiments provide information to the multinational parent that R&D FDI can indeed be successful in a location. It is important to note that the choice to engage in pre-R&D (within or without of the firm) may be a public relations endeavor. Respondents at multinational affiliates in China, for example, readily acknowledged such activities as different from pre-R&D experimentation. Nevertheless, the willingness for the multinational parent to commit resources to PR activities already demonstrates that locations are proving valuable and, by implication, are more likely to be valuable for higher-skilled activities like R&D than locations without such PR efforts.
Several respondents acknowledged that the process of growing R&D centers internationally may not have been planned ex ante. One respondent noted the particularly high bar his firm placed on R&D centers, indicating that his firm did not have a strategy to nurture other types of FDI into internationally integrated R&D facilities. Rather, the firm watched for locations that proved successful in other pursuits. For example, it was not planned but rather came as a pleasant surprise to the firm when an Australian team proved itself in routine pre-R&D activities; this began a snowballing process after which the team was rewarded with full status as an R&D center. A Chinese team in the firm has followed the same path. represented a natural resource extraction firm in Brazil, described how his firm "missed the ball"
in exploiting a new innovation that a Brazilian mining firm had developed -which a multinational competitor acquired. The respondent suggested that his firm has started to search for local sources and invest in its own R&D FDI in Brazil partly in response to this oversight.
Hypothesis 2. Evidence of FDI value added accruing to other firms in an industry and destination country should make it more likely for a given firm to engage in R&D FDI.
R&D FDI is more likely to emerge as part of long-term processes in places that prove themselves to contribute to the firm's competencies. The choice to engage in R&D abroad depends on more than affiliate sales or exports. Rather, valuable pre-R&D efforts, emerging from traditional forms of FDI into production, marketing, extraction, and the like, provide useful signals to multinational parents that R&D FDI in a given country is likely to be successful. These signals can come from within or without of the firm. While this process of building on previous efforts may seem almost intuitive, it implies that government efforts worldwide to target R&D FDI -rather than focusing on previous forms of FDI -are misplaced.
Hypothesis 3. R&D FDI incentive policies are unlikely to have an independent causal effect on firm siting of R&D FDI.
ESTIMATING THE EFFECT OF VALUE ADDED
In this section, I test H1 and H2 that evidence of previously valuable FDI, both in a firm and in an industry in a given destination country, increases the likelihood of future flows of R&D FDI. The identification strategy is off of year-on-year changes in US-origin R&D FDI by destination country-industry. The estimation equation is as follows:
where β 1 is the coefficient of interest, measuring the effect that (lagged) levels of value added by country-industry have on the outcome of interest. X is a matrix of (lagged) time-varying country-level controls, γ ij are fixed effects by country-industry, and τ t are yearly fixed effects. The ideal data will allow for evidence on both hypotheses: previous value exhibited by FDI within the firm and outside the firm each increase the likelihood of future R&D FDI.
Constraining the data to US-origin FDI helps to achieve these goals. Tracking US firms investing over time in the same industry in the same country will, necessarily, include data on many of the same firms. We can thus have more confidence that estimated effects are capturing intra-firm decisions than if the data covered source countries more broadly. However, by focusing on flows to a particular industry-country, we can also have confidence that the data allows us to estimate effects at the industry level and thus across firms. In fact, the limits of this data bias results away from supporting both hypotheses. If only intra-firm effects play a role, including other firms in the industry will muddy results and reduce estimated effects. If only cross-firm signaling matters, limiting the data to only US firms inhibits the ability to estimate the full effect of signals coming from firms of various origins. However, it is important to note that this approach will not allow us to separate out how much R&D FDI is due to intra-firm effects and how much is due to crossfirm effects.
The data covers R&D FDI flows into a maximum of 43 countries, which include developed, middle income, and developing economies (see Appendix 1 for full country list).
Given the variation present in Table 1 , in which countries at diverse levels of development nevertheless receive similar proportions of R&D FDI, including all possible destination countries is the most appropriate means of testing the hypotheses presented here. Indeed, value added can emerge from operations in low-or high-cost environments; multinationals would, broadly speaking, be less likely to invest across countries at different development levels if value added were so easily parsed.
Variable of interest: Value added.
What is it about traditional forms of FDI, in activities like production, marketing, or extraction, that can provide information relevant to pre-R&D and R&D proper? The upgrading argument spelled out here relies not on an affiliate's success in terms of, say, profitability. Rather, the more relevant metric that can provide information on an affiliate's ability to perform R&D is its contribution to value added. Indeed, a key measure of the significance of foreign affiliates to the multinational parent, particularly in a world of modularized production, is the value added activity of a foreign affiliate (Steinfeld 2004 , Sturgeon 2002 . Value added, as defined by the BEA, refers to "the portion of the goods and services…that reflects the production of the firm itself." vii The hypothesis here is that the more value a given firm's investments are adding to a firm's outputs, the more likely it is that further investment in R&D FDI in that location will prove valuable. Analogously, the more value other firms' investments are creating in a given country, the stronger signals a firm receives that upgrading its own FDI to include R&D would be valuable. Value added is in logged US$ millions.
Alternative explanations: Total sales. Total sales (logged US$ millions) captures the value of goods and services sold including those produced in the host country and elsewhere (BEA). Testing the effect of total sales on future R&D FDI allows us to control for marketseeking explanations for R&D FDI, which would predict that higher sales should lead to more R&D FDI. As market-seeking arguments do not distinguish whether the market is supplied locally or internationally, Total sales is an appropriate measure. The correlation with Value added in the sample is 0.14.
Exports. The value of (logged US$ millions) Exports from US affiliates in a given country-industry allows for a test of the proposition that R&D FDI location is determined by the country's potential as an export platform. One set of contributing factors to export potential are the technical resources available in that country that are better able to facilitate production and, perhaps, innovation than other possible investment locations. The argument advanced here, however, is that success as an export platform is not in itself evidence that a location would be likely to be a good host to R&D FDI. Multinationals, with dense intra-firm networks, have the ability to perform R&D elsewhere and transfer the knowledge gained to export-heavy locations; co-location is not integral to export success. A robust literature in political science looks at the effects of democracy in general (Jensen 2003 (Jensen , 2006 and of the protection of property rights in particular (Li and Resnick 2003) on FDI. In the main analyses I therefore include both a measure for Polity score, from autocracy (-10) to democracy (10), well known in the literature (PolityIV). As a whole, country-level political and economic covariates account for determinants of FDI in general, relevant in a study of a specific subset of FDI flows. See Appendix 2 for summary statistics.
RESULTS
The regression results in Table 1 provide consistent evidence for H1 and H2. Model (0) reports the equation's reduced form. Consistent with the hypotheses advanced here, Model (1) reports that a 1 percent increase in value added in a particular country-industry in the previous year is associated with a 13 percent increase in R&D FDI in the following year. The effect size remains large, at 15 percent, in the full Model (4). The magnitude and stability of this relationship suggest that prior firm performance in terms of generating value added is a significant and important predictor of future R&D FDI in a particular country-industry. As mentioned above, this effect may be the result of intra-firm upgrading and/or firm responses to signals of others' successful value added in a particular country-industry. Indeed, in interviews top executives at multinational parent companies and at their foreign subsidiaries mentioned both processes at work. While we cannot conclude from these results why foreign affiliates in a given country were generating more value added, we do have strong evidence that countries with affiliates increasingly important to the parent multinational's creation of value are much more likely to be host to R&D FDI.
In contrast, Sales in the previous year do not have a statistically significant association with future R&D FDI flows, as demonstrated in Models (2) and (4). The non-significance of sales contrasts with the large magnitude and significant coefficient on GDP per capita across models. This variable, which captures development level and availability of infrastructure as well as market size, suggests that a variety of aspects of the domestic economy may help to shape multinational parents' decisions to invest in R&D FDI abroad. However, GDP per capita does not capture market success -in the firm or in the industry -in the way that previous sales do.
Controlling for whether or not the potential market is large, the non-significance of sales provides evidence that, all else equal, successful exploitation of local markets is insufficient to incentivize multinational parents to expand R&D FDI efforts.
Similarly, Exports in the previous year do not have a significant association with future R&D FDI flows in Models (3) As the theory laid out here implies that a change in value added should result in a change in R&D FDI expenditure, Table 2 presents estimations based on a difference-in-difference specification. In Models (5) and (8), the independent effect of value added is again positive and significant, with a year-on-year change in value added associated with a 4 to 9 percent increase in R&D FDI. In Model (6), a positive year-on-year change in affiliate sales is in fact associated with a decline in R&D FDI, providing further evidence that market-seeking explanations as operationalized by sales do not account for R&D FDI outcomes. Exports are again insignificant in both the reduced and full models.
[ Table 2 about here.]
Robustness: Education
To what extent might education levels in the host economy account for changes in R&D FDI? While the above analyses have taken R&D expenditure in the host economy into account, it could be that measures of human capital more accurately reflect the kinds of resources attractive to multinational affiliates considering R&D FDI. As the literature on industrial clusters demonstrates, R&D centers can benefit from access to local resources like local universities (Saxenian 1994) . In interviews conducted for this study, executives occasionally mentioning such local resources. However, in telling the story of moving from FDI to R&D FDI, respondents focused much more on the internal standards that potential R&D locations have to meet than the availability of external resources. Quantitatively, I examine the effects of local human capital resources on R&D FDI with three measures, although data availability restricts the sample considerably. Results are reported in Table 3 . First, in Model (9), I include a measure of the percentage of the host country labor force that has secondary education, which in fact has a negative and significant relationship to R&D FDI levels. Model (10) replaces this variable with the percent of the workforce with university (tertiary) education. In the highly technical and scientific pursuit of R&D, these are the workers that are most likely to make direct contributions to multinational affiliates engaging in R&D. The coefficient is positive as expected but it is outside standard levels of significance. The relationship between university-educated workers and US-origin R&D FDI thus appears weak. Third, in Model (11), I include a measure of R&D spending by universities (UNESCO). If the activities of local universities are attractive to potential foreign R&D investors, then a measure of R&D spending should be a compelling way to account for those attractive characteristics. However, the coefficient is very small and well outside standard levels of significance. To the extent that R&D spending by universities can proxy for the kinds of local networks thought conducive to developing R&D clusters, the link between local university resources and multinational decision-making appears far less important than the prior history of firms in the country-industry. Indeed, the effects of value added in the previous year are, again, significant and large in all Models. In these estimations, increased value added in the previous year is associated with 15 to 16 percent increases in future R&D flows.
[ Table 3 Conditions for receiving incentives include initial investments or increased investments in R&D activities (Johnson 2011 (Johnson , 2013 . However, these countries do not employ R&D FDI incentives in every year. Therefore, I compare country-years with R&D FDI incentives in place to those without in order to isolate any independent effect of the incentives. For robustness, I estimate models that count whether R&D FDI incentives were present in the previous one, two, or three years. If R&D FDI incentives have an independent effect on R&D FDI siting, we would expect to see a positive and significant coefficient on any or all of these covariates. Table 4 reports regression results, in which R&D FDI incentive variables are added to the reduced form model (Model 1) and the sample is reduced to country-industry-year observations for the twelve countries on which R&D FDI incentive information is available. Far from seeing a positive relationship between R&D FDI incentives and US-origin R&D FDI siting, the relationship is consistently negative. In Models (12) and (13), R&D FDI incentives have no independent effect. When R&D FDI incentives were present in the previous one, two, or three years, the relationship is negative and significant -with R&D FDI incentives in fact associated with 8 percent lower levels of R&D FDI (Model 14). This relationship supports the logic not that R&D FDI incentives are signals of attractiveness, but rather that R&D FDI incentives may be signals of underlying reasons not to site R&D FDI in a given country. In other words, a government might be implementing incentives in order to compensate for "unattractive" aspects of the local economy. Much more important, and consistently positive and significant, is the presence of value added in the country-industry in previous years.
RESULTS
[ [ Figure 3 about here.]
INNOVATION IN TOW
Economic globalization offers firms new creative, technical, and innovative resources upon which to draw: the striking growth in R&D FDI is not surprising. Yet why R&D FDI occurs and accumulates in some places more than others, in a way inconsistent with FDI in general, is puzzling. By drawing on interviews with firm-level decision makers as well as quantitative evidence, this paper has argued that the previous value of FDI is key to understanding both the incidence and distribution of R&D FDI across countries. In the process, this paper has disaggregated the concept of FDI in ways that suggest further research into other types of FDI, whether their distributions differ from FDI in general, and why.
Why do firms innovate where they do? The upgrading story presented here argues that locations with existing FDI that provide increasing value added are the locations likely to receive R&D FDI. This process is at least tacitly understood by firm-level decision makers, but it has clear and underemphasized policy implications for national governments. Policies directed toward promoting R&D FDI need at minimum to be aimed at current investors through, for example, "after care" services attempting to spur reinvestment (Guimon 2009 ). Indeed, as reinvestment is an increasingly common component of FDI around the world, the potential for governments to nurture long-term, upgrading processes in firms may indeed exist. However, policymakers must remember that upgrading decisions are internal to the firm and responsive to the experiences of the firm and industry in a given location. By addressing the R&D internationalization process from the firm's perspective, this paper highlights how multinationals' own decision-making ultimately leads them to take advantage of the scientific and technical resources other countries have to offer. ii The United Nations System of National Accounts (SNA) also provides a (somewhat different) definition of R&D; however, the OECD definition has become the international standard and sits behind R&D FDI data used here.
Figures and Tables
iii I rely on US-origin data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) for its comprehensiveness and as US firms account for the lion's share of international R&D flows.
iv Although in 2009 total FDI in China was one thousand times greater than that in Uganda, foreign-sourced R&D in China has accounted for a maximum of 2.7 percent of R&D spending. vi Industry categories are as follows: Finance and insurance; information; manufacturing: chemicals; manufacturing: computers and electronics; manufacturing: electrical equipment; manufacturing: food; manufacturing: machinery; manufacturing: primary and fabricated metals; manufacturing: transportation equipment; mining; professional, scientific, and technical services; utilities; wholesale trade. "Other industries" are dropped from the analysis.
vii Value added also captures the contribution an investment makes to a host country's GDP, because it is calculated based on the value of outputs produced by labor and property in that country (BEA).
viii Data are from the World Bank World Development Indicators unless otherwise noted.
